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COMMENTS
IMPUTING PARENTAL INCOME IN CHILD
SUPPORT DETERMINATIONS: WHAT PRICE
FOR A CHILD'S BEST INTEREST?
Catherine Moseley Clark+
When a marriage is intact, parents provide for their children, finan-
cially and emotionally, as they see fit.' A parent's choice of employment,
or a parent's decision not to work outside the home, is a uniquely private
matter that is based, in part, upon the parents' assessment of their chil-
dren's needs.2 Absent evidence of abuse or neglect, such parental deter-
minations are beyond the reach of the court.3 Following dissolution of a
marriage, however, the courts assume a duty to intervene on behalf of
children, whose youth and dependence warrant special protection.4 This
parens patriae interest is evident in the judiciary's responsibility for de-
termining parental obligations for child support following divorce.5 The
purpose of a court's child support order is to protect the welfare of the
child until the child reaches the age of majority.6 Therefore, courts issue
+J.D. candidate, May 2000, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
1. See Roe v. Doe, 272 N.E.2d 567, 570 (N.Y. 1971) (finding that "Jilt is the natural
right, as well as the legal duty, of a parent to care for, control and protect his child from
potential harm ... and absent a clear showing of misfeasance, abuse or neglect, courts
should not interfere with that delicate responsibility").
2. See Brody v. Brody, 432 S.E.2d 20, 22 (Va. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that in an intact
family, the parents are free to make employment decisions, provided that the children's
"basic needs" are met); see also Auman v. Auman, 464 S.E.2d 154, 156 (Va. Ct. App.
1995) (commenting that an intact family functions as a unit in which family decisions, in-
cluding career choices, are made by consensus).
3. See Commonwealth ex rel. Glenn v. Glenn, 222 A.2d 465, 467 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1966) (declaring that "'[c]ourts have no right to put their fingers into the family pocket-
book and divide the family income"' (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. Decker v. Decker,
203 A.2d 343, 344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964))).
4. See Wagner v. Wagner, 674 A.2d 1, 20 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (describing the
equity courts' power to protect children's best interests as "plenary").
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1994) (establishing a requirement for state guidelines for
child support awards); see also infra note 8 (listing examples of state child support stat-
utes).
6. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(a) (West 1994) ("A parent's first and principal
obligation is to support his or her minor children according to the parent's circumstances
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a child support decree upon dissolution of marriage that is subject to
modification by the court if warranted by the changed circumstances of
either parent.
7
In an effort to achieve uniformity and consistency in these child sup-
port determinations, each state has established guidelines that prescribe
the method for calculating monetary child support obligations.8 Child
support calculations require an evaluation of parental earning capacity,
to the extent consistent with children's best interests.9 In seeking this
balance, state courts agree generally with the opinion voiced by a Mary-
land appellate court, which found that "[tihe law and policy of this State
is that the child's best interest is paramount."' While the virtue of this
sentiment is unassailable, a precise definition of "best interest" is lack-
ing." It is useful to apply the guidance of Maryland's Court of Special
Appeals, which commented that "'[tihe best interest of the child is...
not considered as one of many factors, but as the objective to which vir-
tually all other factors speak.""..2
A commonality in the states' approaches to achieving this "best inter-
ests of the child" objective lies in the child support guidelines' focus on
and station in life."); Goldberger v. Goldberger, 624 A.2d 1328, 1333-34 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1993) ("'Parenthood is both a biological and a legal status. By nature and by law, it
confers rights and imposes duties. One of the most basic of these is the obligation of the
parent to support the child until the law determines that he is able to care for himself...'
(quoting Carroll County v. Edelman, 577 A.2d 14, 23 (Md. 1990))); 24A AM. JUR. 2D Di-
vorce and Separation § 1040 (1998) (setting forth the principle that the court should con-
sider the standard of living that the child would have had if the family had remained in-
tact).
7. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES § 18.2, at 366 (2d ed. 1987) (emphasizing that modification proceedings
require proof of a permanent, rather than temporary, change in circumstances that is rele-
vant to a determination of the appropriate level of child support).
8. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055 (West 1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-16-6-1 (Mi-
chie 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315 (West 1991); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-
201 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (Michie Supp. 1998); see also infra note 26 (dis-
cussing the goals of the child support guidelines).
9. See Regnery v. Regnery, 263 Cal. Rptr. 243,245 (Ct. App. 1989).
10. Reuter v. Reuter, 649 A.2d 24, 33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994).
11. See Wagner v. Wagner, 674 A.2d 1, 19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (offering, in the
context of a child custody case, a litany of terms that demonstrate the ultimate importance
of children's best interests). Citing several other court opinions, the Wagner court de-
scribed children's best interests as being of "paramount concern," "transcendent impor-
tance," and as the "ultimate test" and "determining factor." Id. Whereas the frequent use
of the term "best interests of the child" would indicate that it is a term of art, the sixth edi-
tion of Black's Law Dictionary contains no definition of, or reference to, the phrase.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 160-61, 812-14 (6th ed. 1990).
12. See Wagner, 674 A.2d at 19 (quoting McCready v. McCready, 593 A.2d 1128 (Md.
1991), and offering perspective on the factors requiring consideration in child custody de-
terminations).
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financial considerations.13 Giving concrete form to the elusive concept of
"best interests," child support calculations depend primarily upon the
14parents' income. If the court determines that either parent's actual in-
come does not reflect his or her true earning capacity, however, the court
may impute additional income to that parent. 5 Typically, this imputation
of income occurs when the court determines that a parent has voluntarily
reduced his or her actual income.
6
Appellate courts afford a presumption of correctness to calculations
that result from a court's application of state child support guidelines. 7
Thus, courts deviate from the resulting calculations only under special
circumstances." With limited exceptions, courts have held that a parent's
decision to reduce or eliminate income in order to care for his or her
13. See supra note 8 (providing examples of child support guidelines); see also infra
note 15 (providing examples of statutes that calculate child support based on actual and
imputed parental income).
14. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 315.2.D (West 1991) (requiring that the court
determine the basic child support obligation "by using the combined adjusted gross in-
come of the parties and the number of children involved in the proceeding"); MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(a)(1) (1999) (mandating that "[tlhe basic child support obliga-
tion shall be divided between the parents in proportion to their adjusted actual incomes");
see also infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing the court's general disregard
for a distinction between the custodial and non-custodial parent when making child sup-
port determinations). But see infra note 35 (discussing the Percentage of Income model of
child support, under which only the income of the non-custodial parent is considered).
Note also that the Maryland statute, as interpreted by that state's intermediate appellate
court, "does not provide for imputation of a new spouse's income to a parent upon remar-
riage." See Moore v. Tseronis, 664 A.2d 427,431 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
15. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4058(b) (West 1994) ("The court may, in its discre-
tion, consider the earning capacity of a parent in lieu of the parent's income, consistent
with the best interests of the children."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315(6)(a)-(b) (West
1991) (defining income as "fa]ctual gross income of a party, if the party is employed to full
capacity; or... [p]otential income of a party, if the party is voluntarily unemployed or un-
deremployed"); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-201(b) (1999) ("'Income' means: the
(1) actual income of a parent, if the parent is employed to full capacity; or (2) potential
income of a parent, if the parent is voluntarily impoverished.").
16. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the affect of voluntary reductions in income on
child support determinations).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (1994) (establishing a rebuttable presumption that the
child support award that results from application of state guidelines is the correct amount
of child support); see also infra note 29 and accompanying text (describing the Family
Support Act of 1988, which establishes that the calculations resulting from application of
child support guidelines are presumptively correct).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) (permitting deviation when application of the guidelines
would be "unjust or inappropriate"); CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(k) (West 1994) (permitting
deviation from the guidelines only under "special circumstances"); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 12-202(a)(2)(iv)(2)(C) (1999) (permitting deviation from the guidelines upon a
demonstration that doing so would "serve[] the best interests of the child").
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children does not constitute a special circumstance. 9 Instead, such a de-
cision is simply considered a voluntary reduction in income.2" A parent
who is found to have voluntarily reduced his or her income to provide
care to his or her children is often labeled "voluntarily unemployed" or
"voluntarily underemployed., 21 In such cases, the court may impute in-
come to the parent in an amount consistent with the parent's earning ca-
pacity, often without considering the relative merits of the parent's eco-
nomic and emotional contributions to the child's welfare.22
This Comment first examines relevant child support statutes and case
law, focusing on the circumstances in which courts will impute income to
a parent and the methods for calculating such income. This Comment
then suggests that the courts are inconsistent in ascribing value to paren-
tal caregiving, resulting in the often inappropriate application of the la-
bels "voluntary underemployment" or "voluntary unemployment." This
Comment also posits that, by focusing on parental earning capacity,
courts often undervalue parents' non-financial contributions to a child's
welfare. This Comment then asserts that imputation of income, as typi-
cally calculated by the courts, may fail in its purpose to protect children's
interests. Finally, this Comment offers recommendations for alternative
approaches to the judicial management of parental wage-earning that
may more fully serve the best interests of children.
I. BACKGROUND: PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM DIVORCE
A. Establishment of Child Support Guidelines
Child support determinations are within the exclusive province of state
court authority.23 The courts' historical reliance upon judicial discretion
19. See infra Part I.D (discussing the nurturing parent doctrine exception).
20. See LaBass v. Munsee, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 398-99 (Ct. App. 1997) (declining to
carve out a caregiver exception to the general rule that both parents are equally responsi-
ble for the support of their children).
21. See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing the relevance of the voluntariness of a parent's
reduction in or elimination of income when determining whether to impute income to the
parent).
22. See LaBass, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 398 (imputing income to a mother who was un-
willing to work full time). But see Reuter v. Reuter, 649 A.2d 24, 33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1994) (affirming the trial court's conclusion that the custodial parent was not required to
work full time in order to become self-supporting). The Reuter court stated, "we must re-
mind ourselves of the reason why [the custodial parent] is unable to be self-supporting: her
minor child - [the non-custodial parent's] minor child - is in need of her care and attention,
and she has agreed to shoulder that burden." Id. at 34; see also infra Part I.C (discussing
earning capacity).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 667(a) (1994) (requiring each state to establish child support
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in such matters resulted, however, in significant variations in support or-
ders for families in similar circumstances." In addition, it became appar-
ent that children of divorced parents were not receiving adequate sup-
port." Therefore, in an effort to establish and enforce consistent child
support obligations, Congress enacted the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984.26 These Amendments require each state to estab-
lish mathematical guidelines for child support computations.2  Subse-
guidelines).
24. See 2 MARYGOLD S. MELLI & ANN M. STANTON, ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT &
COUNSEL FEES - AWARD, MODIFICATION & ENFORCEMENT § 13.04(1) (Supp. 1992).
25. See Diane Dodson & Robert M. Horowitz, Child Support Enforcement Amend-
ments of 1984: New Tools For Enforcement, 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3051 (Oct. 23, 1984),
reprinted in CHILD SUPPORT PROJECT, A.B.A., 1 IMPROVING CHILD SUPPORT PRACTICE
i-3 (Diane Dodson & Sherry Green de la Garza compilers, 1986) (describing Congress'
motive for entering the field of family law as a fiscal one, due to the significant cost to the
federal government, under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, re-
sulting from absent parents' failures to support their children); see also CLARK, supra note
7, § 18.1, at 347 (noting the general inadequacy of child support awards).
26. See 98 Stat. 1305, 1321 (1984). At least one commentator defines the purpose of
the law as follows: "By limiting the discretion of trial judges, the guidelines were intended
to have the following effects: '(1) to bridge the "adequacy gap" in child support awards;
(2) to improve the consistency of awards ordered; and (3) to improve the efficiency of
court award processes."' Karl A. W. DeMarce, Devaluing Caregiving in Child Support
Calculations: Imputing Income to Custodial Parents Who Stay Home with Children, 61 MO.
L. REV. 429, 433-34 n.39 (1996) (quoting Jennifer Clifton Ferguson, Missouri Child Sup-
port Guidelines, 57 MO. L. REV. 1301, 1302 (1992)); see also Lewis Becker, Spousal and
Child Support and the "Voluntary Reduction of Income" Doctrine, 29 CONN. L. REV. 647,
650-51 (1997) (discussing inconsistency and unpredictability among the states as well as
providing examples of inconsistent holdings within individual jurisdictions); Marsha Gar-
rison, How do Judges Decide Divorce Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary De-
cision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 404 (1996) (commenting that, due to federal govern-
ment directives, judicial discretion in the area of child support has "been curtailed").
Some commentators predicted that child support guidelines would result in more consis-
tent awards. See Charles Brackney, Battling Inconsistency and Inadequacy: Child Support
Guidelines in the States, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 197, 206 (1988) (predicting that child
support guidelines will result in more consistent awards). But see Melzer v. Witsberger,
480 A.2d 991, 999 (Pa. 1984) (Nix, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that by adopting guidelines,
the court was trying to "transform the highly sensitive process of determining the equita-
ble allocation of responsibility for child support into a rigid and sterile mathematical exer-
cise"); Andrea Giampetro, Mathematical Approaches to Calculating Child Support Pay-
ments: Stated Objectives, Practical Results, and Hidden Policies, 20 FAM. L.Q. 373, 386-88
(1986) (criticizing the guidelines established by the 1984 Amendments by arguing that they
are no better than judicial discretion, and that mathematical formulas serve only as a
mechanism for judges to hide their policy preferences by using purportedly neutral for-
mulas).
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 667(a) (requiring the establishment of child support guidelines as
a condition to receiving federal aid for families with dependent children). For examples of
state codes implementing the mandatory child support guidelines, see CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 4050 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-201 (1999).
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quently, the Family Support Act of 1988 28 established that the numerical
results yielded by the guidelines are presumptively correct. In response
to these requirements, each state enacted legislation establishing both
mathematical guidelines and a rebuttable presumption that the amount
30
of child support derived from such guidelines is correct. Courts may
deviate from this amount, however, if they determine that the result is
not in the "best interests" of the children." The support calculations that
result from application of the guidelines are based primarily on parental
income.32
There are three models under which child support is allocated between
parents: the Income Shares model,3 3 the Melson Formula model,3 4 and
the Percentage of Income model.35 The Income Shares model, which is
used by a majority of states, calculates a child support obligation by
combining the income of both parents and pro-rating the result in pro-
portion to each parent's income." Therefore, in the majority of states,
the income of both parents is considered in calculating the appropriate
amount of child support when applying state child support guidelines.37
28. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 667(b)(2) ("There shall be a rebuttable presumption ... that the
amount of the award which would result from the application of such guidelines is the cor-
rect amount of child support to be awarded.").
30. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(k) (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.1
(West 1991 & Supp. 1999); see also LaBass v. Munsee, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 396 (Ct. App.
1997) (holding that "guideline formula[s] [are] presumptively correct and may not be de-
parted from without an express finding of special circumstances").
31. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(e) (West 1994) (declaring that "[tihe guideline
seeks to place the interests of children as the state's top priority"); MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 12-202(a)(2)(iv)(2)(c) (1999) (allowing the court to depart from the guidelines by
making a written finding stating "how the finding serves the best interests of the child").
32. See supra notes 8, 15 (providing examples of state child support guidelines that
rely on parental income).
33. See JUDITH AREEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 764 (3d ed. 1992);
see also 2 MELLI & STANTON, supra note 24, § 13.03(2) (offering a detailed discussion of
the Income Shares model).
34. See AREEN, supra note 33, at 764. Under the Melson Formula, a certain amount
of self support is deducted from each parent's income before calculating the parties' child
support obligations. See id. The Melson Formula is used in Delaware, Hawaii, West Vir-
ginia, and Montana. See id. at 157 (Supp. 1997).
35. See id. at 157 (Supp. 1997). A minority of states use the Percentage of Income
model, which is based solely on the non-custodial parent's income. See id.
36. See id. at 764. As of 1995, 34 states used the Income Shares model. See id. at 157
(Supp. 1997).
37. See id. at 767.
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B. Computing Income Under the Guidelines
1. Gender-Neutral Application
Historically, most courts held that only fathers were legally obligated
to support their children." Our society's current ideal of gender equality
has called into question the constitutional validity of such views.39 There-
fore, current child support guidelines do not distinguish between mother
and father in establishing the formulas for calculating child support.40 An
examination of the principles that underlie modem income assessments
in the context of spousal support is helpful in understanding the princi-
ples of these gender-neutral rules.41 At least one commentator points out
that in years past, the law tended to protect spouses who had become fi-
nancially dependent as a result of their focus on family care rather than
employment.4' At present, however, courts apply a "gender-neutral ideal
of adult autonomy, which gives priority to financial self-reliance."43
This modern notion of encouraging the financial independence of both
spouses is evident in the standards established for child support calcula-
tions.44 Under state guidelines, courts consider the income of both the
mother and the father, usually without regard to which is the custodial
38. See Lodahl v. Papenberg, 277 S.W.2d 548, 550-51 (Mo. 1955) (finding that a "fa-
ther has the primary common-law duty and obligation to support his minor children").
Courts traditionally held fathers primarily liable, and mothers secondarily liable. See, e.g.,
Haugen v. Swanson, 23 N.W.2d 535, 536 (Minn. 1946).
39. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no state shall "deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws"); see also Conway v. Dana, 318
A.2d 324, 326 (Pa. 1974) (holding that a presumption that fathers are primarily liable is
incompatible with the notion of gender equality).
40. See Commonwealth ex rel. Wasiolek v. Wasiolek, 380 A.2d 400, 402 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1977) (refusing to impute income to the custodial parent of a young child because the
custody decision was made on gender-neutral grounds).
41. See Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony and the Rehabilitation of Family
Care, 71 N.C. L. REv. 721, 722-23 (1993) (discussing the evolution of the law's current fo-
cus on financial independence). For the historical common law rule that fathers had the
primary duty to care for their minor children, see Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340, 351
(1903), in which the Court concluded that "[a]t common law, a father is bound to support
his legitimate children, and the obligation continues during their minority." See also Lu-
plau v. Luplau, 117 S.W.2d 366, 367 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (noting that the father has the
primary responsibility to support the children of a marriage, regardless of whether the
mother has means to do so).
42. See Estin, supra note 41, at 722-23.
43. Id.
44. See LaBass v. Munsee, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 398 (Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the
California Family Code states "unequivocably that both parents are equally responsible
for the support of their children").
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parent,45 when determining the amount of child support due.4
2. Examining Actual and Potential Earnings
Legislatures typically base child support guidelines on the actual in-
come of the parents, but a court may impute additional income to a par-
ent if the court determines that the parent is not fulfilling his or her
earning capacity.47 The court's oversight of the parents' employment de-
cisions is necessary to assure that both parents are fulfilling their parental
responsibilities." Therefore, most state statutes give discretion to the
trial court to substitute earning capacity for actual income where a parent
is unemployed or underemployed and doing so is in the best interests of
the children. 49 Other states expressly direct the court to consider the po-
tential income of an unemployed or underemployed parent.'° A court's
finding that a parent is unemployed or underemployed, however, will
not, alone, result in imputation of income to that parent; the court must
45. See 2 MELLI & STANTON, supra note 24, § 13.03(2) (discussing the Income Shares
model used in a majority of states, which looks to both the mother's and father's income).
But see supra note 35 and accompanying text (observing that a minority of states use the
Percentage of Income model, which distinguishes between custodial and non-custodial
parents).
46. See Bennett v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 668, 672 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (holding
that "[a] custodial parent has no less responsibility to provide support to a minor child
than does the noncustodial parent"); cf Chinn v. Weaver, 600 N.E.2d 1134, 1136 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1991) (suggesting that Ohio's child support guideline statute was an "egregious" im-
balance between custodial parent and non-custodial parent because it provided that the
court could order only the obligor to seek employment). The Chinn court, however, held
that the trial court "must apply the law as it is, wisely or unwisely, given" and had thus
misapplied the Ohio statute by ordering the custodial parent to seek employment. See id.
But see Luciani v. Montemurro-Luciani, 544 N.W.2d 561, 572 (Wis. 1996) (commenting
that "the custodial parent's income is generally not considered under Wisconsin law"); in-
fra Part I.D (discussing the nurturing parent doctrine, under which the courts may distin-
guish between custodial and non-custodial parents).
47. See infra Part I.C (discussing examples of the tests used to determine a parent's
earning capacity).
48. See Paulin v. Paulin, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 318 n.5 (Ct. App. 1996) (contending
that the court requires the ability to consider earning capacity in order to ensure that a
parent cannot unilaterally eliminate his or her responsibility for the support of a child,
thereby placing the entire burden on the employed parent).
49. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4058(b) (West 1994). For examples of other states that
permit, but do not require, consideration of potential income, see GA. CODE ANN. § 19-6-
15(c)(7) (1991); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(b)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1999); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3113.215(A)(5)(a) (Anderson 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-6.10(10)
(Michie 1992); and UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a) (1995).
50. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115(1.5)(b)(III)(b)(I) (West 1998);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.30(2)(b) (West 1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.212(2)(d) (Mi-
chie 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.551(5)(b)(d) (West 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.19.071(6) (West 1997).
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find first that such unemployment or underemployment was voluntary.5
An element of voluntariness is the parent's motive or intent in reduc-
ing or eliminating income, a subject that may arise in several situations."
For example, a parent may choose to pursue educational advancement or
change careers; a parent may become incarcerated; or, most relevant to
the present discussion, the parent may choose to reduce paid work in or-
der to provide care to his or her children." The significance of voluntari-
ness to a parent's unemployment or underemployment lies in the well-
settled notion that a parent may not divest himself or herself of earning
ability at the children's expense.4 State courts and legislatures originally
allowed the imputation of income based on earning capacity to ensure
that parents could not deliberately decrease their earnings in an effort to
shirk their parental responsibilities. This remains a principal purpose in
jurisdictions such as Maryland, where the law refers to a parent's deci-
sion to reduce his or her income as voluntary impoverishment.56 The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in John 0. v. Jane 0,< 7 consulted
Black's Law Dictionary to understand the term voluntarily impover-
ished.m The court concluded that the term means "freely, or by an act of
choice, to reduce oneself to poverty or deprive oneself of resources with
the intention of avoiding child support or spousal obligations. '"5 9 Later,
51. See Niemiec v. Commonwealth ex rel. Niemiec, 499 S.E.2d 576, 579 (Va. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that "[f]ollowing a divorce, a parent may not voluntarily pursue low paying
employment 'to the detriment of support obligations to the children"') (quoting Brody v.
Brody, 432 S.E.2d 20, 22 (Va. Ct. App. 1993)). The burden of proving whether or not un-
employment or underemployment is "voluntary" is on the party to whom income will be
imputed. See Brody, 432 S.E.2d at 22.
52. See infra note 83 (describing situations in which a parent's motive may be rele-
vant to his or her reduced income).
53. See infra note 84 (discussing cases in which the courts have evaluated a parent's
motive in reducing income to pursue education or due to incarceration).
54. See Padilla v. Padilla, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 1995). But see Becker,
supra note 26, at 723 (arguing that resolving child support cases by determining whether
the parent's reduced income was the result of "voluntary" conduct is a question that is
"essentially useless and irrelevant in dealing with the difficult issues presented").
55. See supra note 51; see also DeMarce, supra note 26, at 438 (commenting that
"[w]hile the cases typically do not speak in terms of the custodial/noncustodial parent dis-
tinction, it is apparent.., that the common law rule developed in an effort to enforce the
obligations of the noncustodial parents.").
56. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(b) (Supp. 1999).
57. 601 A.2d 149 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
58. See id. at 156.
59. Id. The court also identified factors to be considered in determining whether a
party is voluntarily impoverished, including:
(1) his or her current physical condition; (2) his or her respective level of educa-
tion; (3) the timing of any change in employment or other financial circumstances
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however, the Maryland Court of Appeals clarified that the term "volun-
tarily impoverished" is not limited to situations where a parent seeks to
avoid a support obligation, holding that the relevant question is simply
whether a parent's impoverishment is voluntary. 6° The court held ex-
pressly that a parent's intent regarding his or her child support responsi-
61
bilities is not relevant to a finding of voluntary impoverishment.
Other courts refuse to consider motive before imputing income to an
underemployed parent.62 In these jurisdictions, motive, whether in good
or bad faith, is irrelevant. 63 The California Court of Appeals, in Padilla v.
Padilla,64 addressed this point clearly, stating that "[s]tatutory commands
and the inherent responsibility parents owe their children lead us to con-
clude the bad faith rule, as applied to child support, if not ill conceived in
the first instance, can no longer be supported., 65 In fact, the California
Court of Appeals expressly rejected the notion that courts should give
special consideration to voluntary reductions in income made by a parent
relative to the divorce proceedings; (4) the relationship between the parties prior
to the initiation of divorce proceedings; (5) his or her efforts to find and retain
employment; (6) his or her efforts to secure retraining if that is needed; (7)
whether he or she has ever withheld support; (8) his or her past work history; (9)
the area in which the parties live and the status of the job market there; and (10)
any other considerations presented by either party.
Id. at 156-57.
60. See Wills v. Jones, 667 A.2d 331,338 (Md. 1995).
61. See id.; see also Goldberger v. Goldberger, 624 A.2d 1328, 1333, 1335 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1993) (imputing income to a non-custodial father who had never sought em-
ployment and intended to spend his life as a permanent Torah/Talmudic student). The
Goldberger court held that "[w]hether the voluntary impoverishment is for the purpose of
avoiding child support or because the parent simply has chosen a frugal lifestyle for an-
other reason, doesn't affect that parent's obligation to the child." Id. at 1335.
62. See generally Becker, supra note 26, at 657-75 (offering a detailed discussion of
various courts' tests regarding the relevance of motive in application of voluntary unem-
ployment and underemployment theories).
63. See Padilla v. Padilla, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 1995) (holding that "[a]
parent's motivation for reducing available income is irrelevant when the ability and oppor-
tunity to adequately and reasonably provide for the child are present"); see also Othman v.
Hinman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 387 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting In re Marriage of Ilas, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 345 (Ct. App. 1993) for the proposition that "[w]hile deliberate avoidance of
family responsibilities is a significant factor in the decision to consider earning capacity,
the statute explicitly authorizes consideration of earning capacity in all cases."). Accord-
ingly, the court in Othman affirmed that the trial court was not limited to considering
earning capacity only when a deliberate attempt to avoid support responsibilities had been
found. See id. But see Gould v. Gould, 687 So. 2d 685, 693 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding
that "voluntary underemployment is a question of good faith of the obligor spouse").
64. 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555 (Ct. App. 1995).
65. Id. at 560. For examples of earlier California cases that imputed income only
upon a finding that the parent was deliberately avoiding his or her support obligations, see
Philbin v. Philbin, 96 Cal. Rptr. 408, 411-12 (Ct. App. 1971) and Catalano v. Catalano, 251
Cal. Rptr. 370, 379 (Ct. App. 1988).
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66
in order that he or she might spend more time with his or her children.
The California court described an "emerging consensus" that the only
circumstances in which courts would not impute income were if the par-
ent had no capacity to earn or if relying on earning capacity would not be
in the children's best interest.67
Whether a court evaluates a parent's motive in reducing or eliminating
his or her income depends upon the underlying statute and judicial dis-
cretion in each case. 68 All courts, however, have either the discretion or
the duty to ascertain a parent's earning capacity and calculate the requi-
site child support payment accordingly.9
C. Measuring Earning Capacity
If the court determines that a parent is voluntarily unemployed or un-
deremployed, the court may impute income based on a determination of
that parent's earning capacity.70 To determine a parent's earning capac-
ity, the courts may analyze a number of factors, as in the three-part test
established in Regnery v. Regnery.7 The court in Regnery held that
earning capacity consists of
(1) the ability to work including factors such as age, occupation,
skills, education, health, background, work experience and
qualifications; (2) the willingness to work exemplified through
66. See LaBass v. Munsee, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 398-99 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Section
4058 [of the California Code] is unmistakably clear that the only qualification to the dis-
cretionary imputation of income is that it be consistent with the children's best interest.
We decline to carve out an exception.., for caregiver parents that would be inharmonious
with the language and policy goals articulated by the Legislature."); see also Othman, 64
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 390 (declining to "adopt a per se rule prohibiting the imputation of income
to parents who refrain from employment in order to care for preschool-age children").
67. See Othman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 389. Emphasizing this point, the court stated that
""'[blad faith" (deliberate avoidance of family financial responsibilities) is not a condition
precedent to imputation of income."' Id. (quoting 1 HOGOBOOM & KING, CAL.
PRACTICE GUIDE: FAMILY LAW 6:441, at 6-125 to 6-126 (The Rutter Group 1996)).
The court in Othman, however, provided no guidance as to how the court should deter-
mine whether relying on earning capacity was in the children's best interest. See id.
68. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing differing views on the relevance of motive or in-
tent on the part of a parent who is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed).
69. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4058(b) (West 1994) (granting the court discretion to
consider a parent's earning capacity rather than the parent's income); cf. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 315.2(B) (West 1991) (requiring that "[i]f a party is voluntarily unemployed or un-
deremployed, his or her gross income shall be determined as set forth in R.S. 9:315.9").
70. See infra notes 71-83 and accomapanying text (discussing various tests for deter-
mining earning capacity).
71. 263 Cal. Rptr. 243 (Ct. App. 1989). For other cases applying the three-part
Regnery test, see LaBass v. Munsee, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 397 (Ct. App. 1997) and Everett
v. Everett, 269 Cal. Rptr. 917, 925 (Ct. App. 1990).
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good faith efforts, due diligence and meaningful attempts to se-
cure employment; and (3) an opportunity to work which means
an employer who is willing to hire.72
Further, the court clarified this test, stating that earning capacity is ab-
sent when the parent lacks the ability or opportunity to work.7
The recent decision in Cohn v. Cohn74 modifies the third element of
the Regnery test by establishing a new standard for determining whether
a non-custodial parent has the opportunity to work." In Cohn, the court
determined that the "employer willing to hire" definition of opportunity
to work established by Regnery was too narrow in the case of profession-
76
als or tradespeople who are self-employable. The court held that a bet-
ter definition of "'opportunity to work' is the substantial likelihood that a
party could, with reasonable effort, apply his or her education, skills and
training to produce income., 77 The Regnery test, as modified by Cohn,
illustrates one state court's approach to determining earning capacity.7
Other jurisdictions apply alternative tests. For example, Maryland's
test for determining earning capacity is comprised of the following fac-
tors:
1. age 2. mental and physical condition 3. assets 4. educational
background, special training or skills 5. prior earnings 6. efforts
to find and retain employment 7. the status of the job market in
the area where the parent lives 8. actual income from any
source 9. any other factors bearing on the parent's ability to ob-
tain funds for child support.
79
Similarly, in Virginia, when considering imputation of income, the
72. Regnery, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
73. See id. The court in Regnery further stated that "[w]hen the payor is unwilling to
pay and the other two factors are present, the court may apply the earnings capacity stan-
dard to deter the shirking of one's family obligations." Id.; see also Othman v. Hinman, 64
Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 389 (Ct. App. 1997) (stating that "[a]s long as ability and opportunity to
earn exists,... the court has the discretion to consider earning capacity when consistent
with the child or children's best interests") (citations omitted).
74. 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866 (Ct. App. 1998).
75. See id. at 871. The court in Cohn denied an unemployed, non-custodial father's
claim that he was not subject to imputation of income because he had looked exhaustively
for work as an attorney and was unable to find an employer willing to hire him. See id. at
870.
76. See id. at 871.
77. Id. It is curious that the court created this new standard under the facts of this
case, as Mr. Cohn had attempted a solo practice for a year with little success. See id. at
870.
78. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (describing the State of California's
test for determining earning capacity).
79. Goldberger v. Goldberger, 624 A.2d 1328, 1335-36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993).
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courts have evaluated factors such as the parent's "financial resources,
education and training."' 8 Whatever test is applied, the factors are finan-
cial in nature. Whether the court will impute the resultant earning ca-
pacity to a parent who reduces his or her income to care for his or her
children will turn, in part, upon whether the particular state gives weight
to the parent's motive.8 The most common approach is to simply reserve
for the trial court the discretion to impute income to underemployed or
unemployed parents in appropriate circumstances.8
D. The Nurturing Parent Doctrine Exception
A limited number of jurisdictions have carved a narrow exception to
the courts' general disregard for a parent's motive or purpose in failing to
maximize his or her earning capacity.8' Under this exception, termed the
80. Niemiec v. Commonwealth ex rel. Niemiec, 499 S.E.2d 576, 579 (Va. Ct. App.
1998).
81. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (describing alternative tests for
measuring earning capacity); see also AREEN, supra note 33, at 758 (proposing an alterna-
tive formula for calculating earning capacity). Professor Areen suggests that the calcula-
tion be based on a computation of "the amount of time actually devoted to parenting by
the custodial parent (taking into account the age and needs of the child(ren)) and then de-
duct[ing] that amount from the hours available for outside work in computing the earning
'capacity' of the custodial parent." Id.
82. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing circumstances in which states consider a parent's
motive in voluntarily reducing income when deciding whether to impute income).
83. See Stanton v. Abbey, 874 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). The Stanton
court provided the following list of factors to assist in the determination of whether in-
come should be imputed:
(1) the age, maturity, health, and number of children in the home; (2) the custo-
dial parent's employment history, including recency of employment and earnings,
as well as the availability of suitable employment; (3) the age and health of the
custodial parent; (4) the availability of appropriate child-care givers; (5) the rela-
tionship between the expense of child-care givers and the net income the custo-
dial parent would receive; (6) the cost, if any, for transportation, suitable cloth-
ing, and other items required for the custodial parent to have the imputed
employment; (7) the custodial parent's motivation or reasons for being at home;
and (8) the adequacy of available resources if the custodial parent remains at
home.
Id. The Pennsylvania courts consider the following factors: "'the age and maturity of the
child, the availability of others who might assist the child, the availability of others who
might assist the parent, the adequacy of financial resources at home, and finally, the par-
ent's desire to stay home and nurture the child."' Kelly v. Kelly, 633 A.2d 218, 219 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993) (quoting Hesidenz v. Carbin, 512 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)).
84. See infra notes 85-98 and accompanying text (discussing the nurturing parent doc-
trine). Note that there are other exceptions to the courts' general disregard for a parent's
motive in limiting his or her earning capacity, such as a court's decision not to impute in-
come to a parent who has reduced his/her income in order to pursue education. See
McHale v. McHale, 612 So. 2d 969, 973 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that "[wihere obligors
have temporarily terminated their employment to obtain additional education which will
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"nurturing parent doctrine," income may not be imputed to a custodial
parent who remains at home, or works less than full time, in order to
provide a nurturing environment for young children.85 Courts may also
refuse to impute income to a custodial parent who is caring for a child
with particular health or other special needs."6 The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth ex rel. Wasiolek v. Wasiolek," aptly es-
poused the rationale for this exception:
It would surely be ironic if by its support order a court were to
dictate that a parent desert a home where very young children
were present when the very purpose of the order is to guarantee
the welfare of those same children. Such an order would ignore
the importance of the nurture and attention of the parent in
whose custody the children have been entrusted and would ele-
vate financial well-being over emotional well-being.8'
ultimately result in higher income, the courts have found the obligors reasonable and justi-
fied in their voluntary change of circumstances"). But see LaBass v. Munsee, 66 Cal. Rptr.
2d 393 (Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing that a mother may choose to pursue her education,
but disallowing her from using that choice to avoid the obligation to financially contribute
to the support of her children). Certain courts have also made exceptions when parental
income is reduced due to incarceration. See Wills v. Jones, 667 A.2d 331, 339 (Md. 1995)
(holding that a prisoner is not voluntarily impoverished unless he or she committed a
crime with intent of going to prison or otherwise becoming impoverished). But see Lay-
man v. Layman, 488 S.E.2d 658, 659 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a parent's incar-
ceration may constitute voluntary unemployment, precluding a reduction of a support ob-
ligation based on loss of income resulting from that incarceration).
85. See Stredny v. Gray, 510 A.2d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (refusing to impute
income to a mother whose child was emotionally disturbed and holding that "an unem-
ployed, nurturing parent should not be expected to find employment to advance a child's
economic welfare at the expense of the child's emotional welfare"); see also AMERICAN
LAW INST., 2 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.06, at 67 & cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1998) (proposing re-
vised guidelines that do not impute earnings to the custodial parent of children who are
not of school age).
86. See Bennett v. Commonwealth ex rel. Bennett, 472 S.E.2d 668, 672 (Va. Ct. App.
1996) (refusing to impute income to a custodial mother who stayed home to care for a
child with Down's Syndrome, as well as to home school her two other children). In a con-
curring opinion, however, Judge Benton takes exception to the court's position based on
his finding that the mother's unavailability for employment was due to her decision to
home school two of her children, and that she voluntarily chose "'the convenience or per-
sonal preference.., to remain unproductive.., so as to avoid support obligations."' Id. at
674-75 (Benton, J., concurring) (quoting Hur v. Virginia Dep't of Social Servs., 409 S.E.2d
454, 458 (Va. Ct. App. 1991)).
87. 380 A.2d 400 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
88. Id. at 403 (citatibn omitted). Note that the Pennsylvania Superior Court has also
applied the nurturing parent doctrine when the custodial parent sought to stay home in
order to care for the child of a subsequent marriage. See Hesidenz v. Carbin, 512 A.2d
707, 709-10 & n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (reciting an earlier holding that "the fact that the
child to be nurtured is not the subject of the support order does not necessarily remove the
case from the application of the 'nurturing parent' doctrine"); see also Thomas v. Thomas,
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The court in Wasiolek also gave significant weight to the parent's
opinion as to whether the children are better served by the custodial par-
ent remaining at home. 8' Although thenurturing parent doctrine is usu-
ally applied in the context of custodial parents, on occasion the courts
have held that a non-custodial parent's decision to reduce his or her em-
ployment may not be "voluntary underemployment" warranting imputa-
tion of income. 90 This result may occur when the non-custodial parent's
reduction in employment is motivated by the goal of maximizing visita-
tion.91
Whereas the nurturing parent doctrine is not always identified as
589 A.2d 1372, 1372-73 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (refusing to impute income to a
mother who was the full-time custodian of children from a second marriage). The court in
Thomas concluded that "[t]o rule otherwise would, in effect, determine that monetary
contributions to children living with another is more important than providing care to
children in the obligor's custody." Id. But see Othman v. Hinman, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383,
391 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the California Family Code "does not require awards
based on earning capacity to be consistent with the best interests of any child other than
the child or children who are the subject of the child support award"); Moore v. Tsernois,
664 A.2d 427, 432 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (commenting on a mother's decision to re-
main home with children from a second marriage by stating that "[i]t is unreasonable to
expect the children of the Defendant's first marriage to pay for this choice"); Canning v.
Juskalian, 597 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that "the words 'custodial
parent with children' do not encompass the children of a subsequent marriage").
89. See Wasiolek, 380 A.2d at 403 (holding that while a parent's opinion is not dis-
positive, it should be given significant weight). The Wasiolek court also defined the factors
that should be balanced before the nurturing parent should be required to seek employ-
ment, including "age and maturity of the child; the availability and adequacy of others who
might assist the custodian-parent; [and] the adequacy of available financial resources if the
custodian-parent does remain in the home." Id.
90. See infra note 91 (providing examples of decisions not to impute income to non-
custodial parents who had voluntarily reduced their income).
91. See Gould v. Gould, 687 So. 2d 685, 693 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a non-
custodial father was not voluntarily underemployed for purposes of determining his child
support obligation when he reduced his work hours by taking off every other Friday in
order to make a bi-weekly ten hour drive to visit his children); see also Mullin v. Mullin,
634 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that a father who reduced his over-
time work in order to increase visitation with his children was not voluntarily underem-
ployed). In Mullin, the court noted that "[a] high value should be placed on visitation be-
tween the children and the noncustodial parent. In the vast majority of cases, maintaining
a close relationship and frequent contact between the children and both parents is recog-
nized as being in the best interest of the children." Id. at 1342 (citations omitted); see also
Canning, 597 N.E.2d at 1075-76 (imputing income to custodial mother who was earning
much less than she could, thereby adjusting non-custodial father's support responsibilities
in recognition of the fact that he would incur significant expenses in exercising his visita-
tion rights after his ex-wife and their son moved to California). The Canning court relied
upon express provisions of the state child support guidelines that note that the non-
custodial parent may incur significant travel-related expenses when exercising visitation
rights. See id. at 1076. The Canning court recommended considering such travel expenses
when calculating the support decree in order to foster parental involvement with the chil-
dren. See id.
Catholic University Law Review Vol. 49:167
such,92 the underlying principle, which recognizes the necessity and value
of parental care-giving to young children, is evident in state statutes that
prohibit the imputation of income to the at-home custodial parent of
young children. 93 Such statutes often establish an absolute exception to
the imputation of income when a parent is caring for children under a
prescribed age. Except as established by statute, however, the nurtur-
ing parent doctrine is not absolute.95 Instead, the doctrine simply en-
courages the court to consider a parent's desire to nurture his or her
children.9 Although the courts have been sensitive to the fact that an as-
sessment of earning capacity requires an intrusion into previously private
employment decisions,97 divorced parents relinquish the autonomy of de-
cisionmaking that exists in an intact marriage in favor of the over-arching
goal of serving children's best interests.98
92. See Hesidenz, 512 A.2d at 711 (denying appellant's argument that the trial court's
failure to use the phrase "nurturing parent doctrine" disallowed application of the doc-
trine, noting that "[t]o impose such a requirement would evaluate form over substance").
93. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1(B)(3) (Michie Supp. 1999) (stating that "[i]ncome
may not be imputed to the custodial parent when a child is not in school, child care serv-
ices are not available and the cost of such child care services are not included in the com-
putation"); see also infra note 94 (providing additional examples of state statutes adopting
implicitly the nurturing parent doctrine).
94. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9 (West 1991) ("If a party is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed, child support shall be calculated based on a determina-
tion of his or her income earning potential, unless the party ... is caring for a child of the
parties under the age of five years."); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(b)(2) (Supp.
1999) ("A determination of potential income may not be made for a parent who: ... (ii) is
caring for a child under the age of 2 years for whom the parents are jointly and severally
responsible."). The Louisiana statute has been strictly applied. See Greene v. Greene, 634
So. 2d 1286, 1289 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that a mother who voluntarily quit her job
in order to be home with her children who were over age five was voluntarily unemployed,
requiring consideration of her earning potential).
95. See infra note 96 (discussing the absence of a definitive rule with respect to the
nurturing parent doctrine).
96. See Bender v. Bender, 444 A.2d 124, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (stating that there
is no "absolute rule" that income is not imputed to a parent at home caring for young chil-
dren). The court in Bender required only that a parent's desire to stay home with minor
children be considered, holding that the parent may be excused from contributing support
payments in "appropriate cases." See id.
97. See Rohloff v. Rohloff, 411 N.W.2d 484, 488 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (describing
the difficult balancing of interests involved when a noncustodial parent reduces his or her
income). In Rohloff, the court noted that whereas courts must not interfere unnecessarily
with individuals' personal choices merely because they are divorced, the divorce process
thrusts courts into their personal lives in order to protect their children. See id.
98. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' role in protecting
children upon the divorce of their parents).
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II. ASSESSING CHILDREN'S INTERESTS WHEN IMPUTING INCOME:
INCONSISTENCY ABOUNDS
A. Valuing Caregiving: Inconsistency Among the Courts
Courts of all jurisdictions share a consistency of purpose-to serve
children's best interests." Most states also share a similar methodology
for calculating child support, applying the Income Shares model, which
considers the incomes of both parents in calculating the parents' child
support responsibilities.'O° The states diverge, however, in determining
the circumstances in which imputation of income is warranted."" Specifi-
cally, state courts vary in the weight given to a parent's motive in limiting
his or her income, including choices made to maximize the parent's abil-
ity to spend time with his or her children.1 2 By failing consistently to
consider parental motive when a reduction in income results from a par-
ent's desire to have increased involvement with his or her child, the
courts are necessarily inconsistent in ascribing value to parental caregiv-
ing. 1
3
1. A Strict Construction Approach: Disregarding Parental Motive
Certain states, like California, give no weight to a parent's motive in
limiting his or her employment, including parental decisions to limit em-
ployment in order to provide care to a child °4 California's statutory
command is simply to "consider the earning capacity of a parent in lieu
of the parent's income, consistent with the best interests of the chil-
dren."1 5 The statute does not define "best interest," nor does it express
any requirement to consider the reason for a parent's choice to limit em-
99. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (discussing the overriding objective
of serving children's best interests).
100. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing the Income Shares model).
But see supra notes 34-35 (discussing alternative child support models known as the Mel-
son Formula and the Percentage of Income model).
101. See infra Part II.A.1 (providing examples of states that disregard parental motive
when imputing income to underemployed or unemployed parents); see also infra Part
II.A.3 (setting forth examples of states that consider parental motive when imputing in-
come to underemployed or unemployed parents).
102. See infra Parts II.A.1-3 (describing varying judicial approaches to considering pa-
rental motive for reductions in income).
103. See infra Parts II.A.1-3 (offering a discussion of various states' approaches to con-
sidering parental motive in reducing income to care for children and the effects of such
approaches on the value ascribed by courts to caregiving).
104. See supra notes 64-66 (discussing the irrelevance of parental motive in California
law, and the state's refusal to carve out an exception for caregivers).
105. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4058(b) (West 1994).
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ployment, such as a desire to provide for the child emotionally.' °6 Cali-
fornia courts have clearly interpreted this silence as legislative intent to
disregard parental motive in limiting employment when deciding
whether to impute income. This understanding is evident in the cur-
rent application of California's three-part test to determine the earning
capacity of a parent who is underemployed or unemployed.' s When this
test was first established in Regnery v. Regnery,'0 the court found that a
noncustodial father's deliberate refusal to make modest child support
payments, coupled with his failure to make reasonable efforts to find
employment, reflected a desire to avoid his familial obligations." ° This
commentary indicates the Regnery court's evaluation of the father's mo-
tive in terminating his employment."'
The California courts still apply a variation of the Regnery test."2 The
106. See id. § 4053 (listing the principles to be followed by the courts in implementing
uniform guidelines). Other than the sweeping guidance of § 4053(e) (stating that "[t]he
guideline seeks to place the interests of children as the state's top priority"), the statute
offers no guidance on how the courts should evaluate considerations associated with
meeting children's emotional needs. See id.
107. See supra notes 65-67 (discussing the fact that motive is irrelevant in California);
see also LaBass v. Munsee, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 397 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that "[i]f a
parent is unwilling to work despite the ability and the opportunity, earning capacity may
be imputed. A parent's motivation for not pursuing income opportunities is irrelevant
when applying the Regnery test.") (citations omitted).
108. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text (discussing California's three-part
test for measuring earning capacity).
109. 263 Cal. Rptr. 243 (Ct. App. 1989). The test to determine the earning capacity of
a parent consists of an analysis of: "(1) the ability to work including such factors as age,
occupation, skills, education, health, background, work experience and qualifications; (2)
the willingness to work exemplified through good faith efforts, due diligence and meaning-
ful attempts to secure employment; and (3) the opportunity to work which means an em-
ployer who is willing to hire." Id. at 245.
110. See id. at 246.
111. See id. at 245-47 (reviewing the father's historical conduct in great detail, finding
that he had deliberately refused to pay child and spousal support and that he voluntarily
left employment merely because it was arduous). The court in Regnery concluded that
"the evidence fully supports the [trial] court's implied finding [that] his avoidance of fam-
ily financial responsibilities was deliberate." Id. at 248.
112. See Cohn v. Cohn, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866, 871 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding that the
"employer willing to hire" definition established in Regnery was too narrow to address
professionals or tradespeople who are self-employable). The court in Cohn redefined the
"opportunity to work" element to mean "the substantial likelihood that a party could, with
reasonable effort, apply his or her education, skills and training to produce income." Id.
In Cohn, the court applied its new standard for earning capacity to a non-custodial father
who had been unsuccessful, after considerable effort, in obtaining work as a lawyer. See
id. at 870. Pursuant to the new definition, the court remanded the case for a trial court
determination as to the amount of income that should be imputed to Mr. Cohn based on
what he could reasonably expect to earn as a sole practitioner. See id. at 871-72. The
court also suggested that the trial court focus on whether Mr. Cohn exercised "reasonable
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issue of parental motive which gave rise to the creation of the three-part
test, is, however, no longer relevant."3 Instead, when a parent is capable
of providing for his or her child, the parent's motive for reducing his or
her income is irrelevant. The California courts' disregard for parental
motive extends to a parent's desire to nurture his or her children."'
Rather than making children a state priority,"6 California has chosen to
ignore a parent's motive in reducing income even when the choice is in
favor of caregiving."7
2. A Moderate Approach: Acknowledging Parental Caregiving Choices
The statutory and decisional law in Maryland represents a juxtaposi-
tion of theories regarding the value of caregiving. 8 On one hand,
Maryland courts demonstrate a strong presumption against parental de-
cisions to decrease or eliminate employment."9 The state's use of the
dramatic phrase "voluntary impoverishment" in lieu of the more neutral
terms "voluntary unemployment" or "voluntary underemployment" used
120by most states exemplifies this presumption. On the other hand,
Maryland's statute provides a limited exception to the imputation of in-
diligence in developing his law practice." Id. at 872. Although California holds both the
custodial and non-custodial parents to the same standard for measuring earning capacity,
see CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(b) (West 1994), the court was silent on the possible impact of
its holding on custodial parents who possess professional skills. See Cohn, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 870-72.
113. See supra notes 64-66 (discussing cases in which the California courts have estab-
lished that parental motive in reducing income is irrelevant).
114. See Padilla v. Padilla, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 1995).
115. See LaBass v. Munsee, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 398-99 (Ct. App. 1997) (stating that
"[w]e decline to carve out an exception.., for caregiver parents").
116. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(e) (West 1994) (establishing the goal of placing "the
interests of children" as California's "top priority").
117. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the California courts'
position that motive is irrelevant when determining whether a parent is voluntarily unem-
ployed or underemployed, and specifically declining to make an exception for caregiver
parents). But see Meegan v. Meegan, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 801 (Ct. App. 1992) (reducing a
child support order when the obligor, a business executive, quit his job to enter a monas-
tery).
118. See infra notes 119-36 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland case law that
addresses the value of caregiving).
119. See infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing Maryland's child support
statute).
120. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(b) (1999); see also John 0. v. Jane 0.,
601 A.2d 149, 156 n.5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (noting that before the legislature passed
the final version of the child support guidelines, it substituted the term "voluntarily im-
poverished" for the phrase "unemployed or underemployed"). The court in John 0.
stated that by substituting the term "voluntarily impoverished," the Legislature "evinced
its intention that the courts be able to consider whether a person had purposely taken a
reduction in salary to avoid his or her support obligations." Id.
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come for custodial parents of children under the age of two."' Addition-
ally, the harshness of the phrase "voluntary impoverishment" is amelio-
rated by the Maryland courts' willingness to consider, to a limited extent,
a parent's motive in reducing his or her income."
Whereas the Maryland courts articulate forcefully an emphasis on the
voluntariness of a parent's unemployment or underemployment,"' the
case law demonstrates that Maryland courts will typically impute income
only to a parent who is underemployed or unemployed for reasons thecourt finds ... 124 , 2
court finds meritless. For example, in Wagner v. Wagner,12 1 where the
court concluded that a custodial mother had voluntarily impoverished
herself, the court discussed extensively the meaning of voluntary impov-
erishment. 126 Focusing on the voluntary aspects of the employment deci-
sion, the court held that a parent's intention regarding support paymentsis " " 127
is irrelevant. Nonetheless, the court emphasized factors relevant to
motive.12' For example, the court found that the mother had deliberately
transferred her only asset to her parents in exchange for minimal consid-
eration, that she had freely contracted to work at one-third of her previ-
ous salary, and that she had a history of attempting to avoid court or-
121. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(b)(2)(ii) (1999).
122. See Wills v. Jones, 667 A.2d 331, 335 (Md. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that "a court
must inquire as to the parent's motivations and intentions" in order to decide if a parent is
voluntarily impoverished); see also infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text (discussing
cases in which the Maryland court has considered a parent's motive in reducing his or her
income).
123. See Wagner v. Wagner, 674 A.2d 1, 22 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996) (summarizing
the Maryland courts' position on the ultimate significance of voluntariness over motive or
intention in determining whether a parent is voluntarily impoverished). The court in
Wagner reiterated the reasoning articulated in Wills:
In determining whether a parent is voluntarily impoverished, the question is
whether a parent's impoverishment is voluntary, not whether the parent has vol-
untarily avoided paying child support. The parent's intention regarding support
payments, therefore is irrelevant. It is true that parents who impoverish them-
selves "with the intention of avoiding child support.., obligations" are voluntar-
ily impoverished. But ... a parent who has become impoverished by choice is
"voluntarily impoverished" regardless of the parent's intent regarding his or her
child support obligations.
Id. (quoting Wills, 667 A.2d at 338) (internal citations omitted).
124. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text (analyzing Maryland court deci-
sions that rely purportedly upon voluntariness of a parent's reduced earning capacity in
determining whether income should be imputed, but that actually give weight to the mo-
tive behind a parent's voluntary acts).
125. 674 A.2d 1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996).
126. See id. at 22-23.
127. See id. at 22.
128. See infra note 129 and accompanying text (describing the factors considered by
the Wagner court).
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Applying a similar approach, the court in Moore v. Tseronis,13 al-
though still articulating the importance of voluntariness over motive for a
finding of "voluntary impoverishment,''. found that a father had not
voluntarily impoverished himself even though he had voluntarily relo-
cated to a geographic area with a weaker economy, thereby diminishing
his earnings.32 The court in Moore stated that a parent's child support
obligations should not immobilize a parent from making reasonable job
and location decisions.' The court also noted that it did not appear that
the father was attempting to "shirk his child support obligations."'34 In
sum, although Maryland law provides expressly for consideration of
caregiving issues only in the case of custodial parents of children under
two,'35 the Maryland courts generally give a broader consideration to pa-
rental motive in reducing income.'36
3. A Deferential Approach: Respecting Parental Caregiving Decisions
Other states, such as Louisiana, consistently consider motive, giving
significant weight to parental caregiving choices that may result in a re-
duction in income. 37 Pursuant to statute, the Louisiana courts will not
129. See Wagner, 674 A.2d at 23. Notwithstanding the court's analysis of the mother's
apparently deliberate attempts to reduce her earning capacity, the court went out of its
way to state that the fact that the trial court had concluded that the mother impoverished
herself with the intention of avoiding her child support obligations was "of no conse-
quence." Id. The court in Wagner also stated that parents who act in order to avoid their
child support obligations deliberately are simply a subset of the class of parents who vol-
untarily impoverish themselves by deliberately reducing their income for any reason. See
id.
130. 664 A.2d 427 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
131. Id. at 430 (affirming that "'for the purposes of the child support guidelines, a par-
ent shall be considered "voluntarily impoverished" whenever the parent has made the free
and conscious choice, not compelled by factors beyond his or her control, to render him-
self or herself without adequate resource."' (quoting Goldberger v. Goldberger, 624 A.2d
1328 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993)).
132. See id. at 431.
133. See id.
134. Id. (noting further that the father did not intend to live a "lifestyle of ease or in-
dolence").
135. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 12-204(b)(2) (1999).
136. See supra notes 125-34 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases in
which the Maryland courts gave weight to parental motive underlying a voluntary decision
to reduce income).
137. See infra notes 138-52 and accompanying text (discussing Louisiana's approach to
weighing caregiving when deciding whether to impute income to a parent in a child sup-
port determination). Pennsylvania courts exhibit a similar willingness to evaluate parental
motive in voluntarily reducing income, going so far as to refuse to impute income to a
Catholic University Law Review
impute income to a parent who is voluntarily unemployed or underem-
ployed if that parent is caring for a child of the parties under the age of
five.13 8 Furthermore, the Louisiana courts have refused to impute income
to parents who have reduced income specifically to spend time with a
child. 9 In Saussy v. Saussy,14° the Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's decision not to impute income to a non-custodial father
who took a lower paying job so that he could spend more time with his
children.41 Unlike his previous job, the father's new employment gave
him the opportunity to visit his children on the weekends.'42 Accord-
ingly, the court affirmed the trial court's finding that he acted in good
faith when he accepted the new job.
Similarly, the court in Gould v. Gould'4 found that a non-custodial fa-
ther who had reduced his income voluntarily by taking every other Fri-
day off in order to make a ten hour drive to visit his children was not
voluntarily underemployed. 45 The court recognized that voluntary un-
116deremployment is a question of good faith . The court affirmed the trial
court's holding that it would be "inequitable" to punish the father for
time missed at work in order to exercise visitation rights because the fa-
ther had been regular and diligent in exercising these rights.47 Further-
mother who chose to stay home to care for a child from a second marriage. See Stredny v.
Gray, 510 A.2d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986). The court in Stredny held that "[j]ust as we
cannot force a parent to choose between a child's economic and emotional welfare, we
cannot force a custodial parent to choose between the economic welfare of one child...
and the emotional welfare of another, her second child." Id. (citation omitted). Most
courts have not taken this position, but rather limit their decisions not to impute income to
custodial parents to situations in which the child in that parent's custody is the child who is
the subject of the support order. See supra note 88 (providing examples of cases in which
the court imputed income to custodial parents of children from a subsequent marriage).
138. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9 (West 1991).
139. See infra notes 140-51 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which the Lou-
isiana courts have declined to impute income to parents who voluntarily reduced their in-
come in order to spend time with their children).
140. 638 So. 2d 711 (La. Ct. App. 1994).
141. Seeid. at 714.
142. See id.
143. See id. The court in Saussy stated that "[a] father's children benefit not only by
the money he is able to earn, but by the presence of his company, and nowhere does the
law require that a parent work 60-70 hours to the detriment of his children's right to the
parent's company." Id. In the dissenting opinion, however, Judge Knoll found that "un-
der our jurisprudence, a parent ... claiming to work for less money so the parent can
spend more time with the children, is voluntarily underemployed, albeit, a worthy desire."
Id. at 715 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
144. 687 So. 2d 685 (La. Ct. App. 1997).




1999] Imputing Parental Income in Child Support Determinations 189
more, the court in McHale v. McHale'4 demonstrated the importance of
good faith when evaluating parental motive in decreasing income.149 In
that case, the court imputed income to a non-custodial father who had
relocated and was unable to obtain a job at a salary level similar to that
earned previously, even though the purported reason for the move was
to be near his children. In making its decision, the court observed that
the father had not exercised fully his visitation rights in the past and had
been frequently in arrears with child support payments."' These cases
demonstrate that the State of Louisiana values parental caregiving, and
gives credence to good faith parental motive when determining whether
to impute income to an underemployed or unemployed parent.'52
B. Valuing Caregiving: Inconsistency in Related Areas of Law
It is primarily in the area of child support that the law fails to recognize
sufficiently, or consistently, the value of non-monetary contributions to
the family such as caregiving"' In matters of spousal support or prop-
erty distribution, for example, the courts acknowledge consistently a
spouse's non-monetary contribution to the family's general welfare.
54
148. 612 So. 2d 969 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
149. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text (addressing implicitly the impor-
tance of good faith).
150. See McHale, 612 So. 2d at 971, 974.
151. See id. at 972.
152. See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing cases which demonstrate the value that Louisi-
ana affords parental caregiving choices). For an example of another court's express con-
sideration of parental motive, see Stanton v. Abbey, 874 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994), which included "the custodial parent's motivation or reasons for being at home" in
a list of factors to be considered when deciding whether to impute income. See also Kelly
v. Kelly, 633 A.2d 218, 219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (identifying "'the parent's desire to stay
home and nurture the child"' as a factor to be considered when imputing income (quoting
Hesidenz v. Carbin, 512 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986))).
153. See infra notes 154-76 and accompanying text (discussing contrasting approaches
to valuing caregiving in the context of child support, maintenance support, and property
distribution). See generally Estin, supra note 41 (analyzing the principles underlying mod-
ern divorce law with respect to the valuation of caregiving).
154. See Reuter v. Reuter, 649 A.2d 24, 33 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (declining to im-
pute income to a custodial mother who worked only part-time when calculating appropri-
ate alimony payment). In Reuter, the mother had custody of the couple's two children,
ages four and seven. See id. at 26-27. The mother testified that the younger boy was hav-
ing trouble adjusting to his parent's separation, and a clinical psychologist concluded that
spending a full day in day care would not be in the child's best interests. See id. at 27. The
court accepted this testimony and did not require the mother to act contrary to the best
interests of her child in order to be self-supporting. See id. at 33. The court reached this
conclusion, however, in the alimony portion of its decision, not in the analysis relating to
child support. See id. at 31-33. See also DeMarce, supra note 26, at 448-52 (discussing the
"partnership" concept of marriage as an influence on the increasing recognition of the
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The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) takes the position
that a spouse may legitimately obtain maintenance support if he or she is
the custodian of a child "whose condition or circumstances make it ap-
propriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside
the home. 55  Similarly, the UMDA position on property distribution
upon divorce directs the courts to consider the "contribution of a spouse
as homemaker."'56 For instance, the Connecticut Appellate Court, in
O'Neill v. O'Neill,157 held that "[t]he investment of human capital in
homemaking has worth and should be evaluated in a property division
incident to a dissolution of marriage." '58 The O'Neill court expressly re-
quired consideration of caretaking responsibilities in making the prop-
erty distribution.9
In contrast, many states do not express consideration for the non-
financial contributions of a parent when dealing with child support.' ° In-
stead, parents who are unemployed or underemployed in order to care
for their children are "voluntarily underemployed" or "voluntarily un-employed" and, therefore, may be subject to imputation of income.' 61
" a , t m162 .
Even where courts give effect to the nurturing parent doctrine, it is ap-
plied as an exception, rather than granting the presumptive value to non-
financial familial contributions that is evident in most property distribu-
value of homemaking in divorce law); Estin, supra note 41, at 748 (discussing research
showing that "homemaking and wage earning contributions to a family are to be treated
equivalently on dissolution of the marriage"). Note, however, that the equitable theory of
valuing non-monetary contributions to the family is irrelevant in property distribution
cases within community property jurisdictions. See AREEN, supra note 33, at 716. In Ari-
zona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington, the
eight community property states, all marital property is subject to division upon divorce.
See id.
155. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE Acr § 308(a)(2), 9A U.L.A. 347, 348 (1998).
Eight states have substantially adopted the UMDA. See AREEN, supra note 33, at 348; see
also Estin, supra note 41, at 727 n.16, 728 n.18 (providing examples of state statutes that
reflect variations of the UMDA position).
156. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 307 [Alternative B1, 9A U.L.A. 288
(1998).
157. 536 A.2d 978 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
158. Id. at 984.
159. See id. The Michigan Appellate Court found that a law degree was a marital asset
subject to property division because the degree was the product of a "concerted family
effort." Postema v. Postema, 471 N.W.2d 912, 918 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991). The Postema
court recognized the value of "intangible, nonpecuniary" efforts, such as child rearing. Id.
at 920.
160. See supra Part I.C (discussing the courts' processes for determining earning ca-
pacity).
161. See supra notes 52-62 and accompanying text (discussing voluntary underem-
ployment and voluntary unemployment and the resultant imputation of income).
162. See supra Part I.D (discussing the nurturing parent doctrine exception).
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tion cases.'63
By definition, the labels of "voluntary unemployment" and "voluntary
underemployment" rest on the foundational assumption that child care is
not work-a position with which few parents would agree.16 In fact, few
people would argue that a parent at home with children and managing
household duties is unoccupied.16 1 Yet, somehow, these efforts are not
considered "work" in the eyes of the law.'66 One commentator accurately
summarized this conundrum by stating that
Despite its economic, social, and familial importance, the work
of caregiving remains invisible to lawyers and judges because
the law construes family care as a matter of love and obligation,
not a matter of personal choice or arm's-length bargaining ....
By its very nature, nurturance is supposed to be silent, hidden,
selfless, and self-effacing-"something different" from work.167
163. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text (discussing the value ascribed to
caregiving in property distribution cases).
164. See Estin, supra note 41, at 782. Professor Estin describes a
series of... custody opinions issued by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals [in which] the court suggested [that] the "caring and nurturing duties of a
parent" [are]: (1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and
dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including
nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers
after school, i.e., transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or boy
scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e., babysitting, day care, etc.; (7)
putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night, waking
the child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e., teaching general manners and toilet
training; (9) educating, i.e., religious, cultural, social, etc.; and (10) teaching ele-
mentary skills, i.e., reading, writing and arithmetic.
Id.
165. See supra note 164 (providing one court's summation of the duties of a custodial
parent).
166. See Estin, supra note 41, at 767 (commenting that "[I]awyers encounter difficulty
in conceptualizing marriage as a financial relationship, and the difficulty is the greatest in
those areas of family life defined by tangles of love and obligation"). Professor Estin rea-
sons, "[t]hese contributions transcend everyday economic life ... [blut to set them aside as
beyond the grasp of concepts like 'justice' is to abandon the family law policy of valuing all
of the contributions a husband and wife make." Id.
167. Id. at 776 (citations ommitted). Professor Estin also points out that "[claregiving
work, when well done, is substantially invisible, seen not as work but as love, instinct, or
the natural order of things." Id. at 776 n.205. For a rare case finding that child care is
work, see Thomas v. Thomas, 589 A.2d 1372, 1373 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) ("It is
important to note that [the mother] is not unemployed. She is employed on a full-time
basis as a caregiver to her young children. This employment is, however, not compensated
monetarily."). See also Stredny v. Gray, 510 A.2d 359, 364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (refusing
to impute income to a mother who was the full-time custodian of her child from a second
marriage, observing that "'[a] parent of minor children who works in the home caring for
children should be viewed as employed although he or she usually receives no paycheck at
the end of the week' (quoting Butler v. Butler, 488 A.2d 1141, 1142 (Pa. Super. Ct.
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This commentator also suggests that the courts are resistant to ascrib-
ing financial value to caregiving for fear of "commercializing" mar-
riage. 168 Whether it is due to these proposed theories, or simply because
there is no ready "market" for family caregiving, 69 the fact remains that
courts generally ascribe no monetary value to caregiving when making
child support determinations.'70
Certainly, intangibles such as love, care, and nurture do not readilylendtheselvs t moetar ..... 171
lend themselves to monetary quantification. Caregiving does have a
financial component, however, given the costs of child care, transporta-
tion, clothing, and other expenses associated with working outside the
home.' Nonetheless, non-monetary contributions to a family, if ad-
dressed in the child support guidelines at all, are typically relegated to
catch-all phrases such as "any other consideration,'7 3 or "special circum-
stances.' ' 174 This approach contrasts dramatically with the value courts
1985))).
168. See Estin, supra note 41, at 775. Professor Estin calls this concern "paradoxical,"
pointing out that marriage is, by its nature, partly an economic venture, which becomes
particularly apparent upon death or divorce. See id. at 775-76. Professor Estin suggests
that the true concern of judges may be "the risk that if the law inquires into caregiving it
will be forced to expose the traditionally private aspects of family life." Id. at 776. Certain
courts have also expressed a concern about commercializing marriage. See Hoak v. Hoak,
370 S.E.2d 473, 478 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that "[m]arriage is not a business arrangement,
and this Court would be loathe to promote any more tallying of respective debits and
credits than already occurs in the average household"); see also Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661
P.2d 196, 207 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) ("[T]he courts cannot and will not strike a balance re-
garding the contributions of each to the marriage and then translate that into a monetary
award. To do so would.., reduce the institution of marriage to that of a closely held cor-
poration.").
169. See DeMarce, supra note 26, at 446 n.109 (commenting on the relationship of
non-economic familial contributions to the traditional employment marketplace).
170. See supra notes 160-63 (discussing the fact that the law does not often address, in
a monetary context, caregiving and similar intangible family matters).
171. See supra note 166 (discussing the difficulty of assessing the non-economic values
of family life in the economic context of divorce).
172. See DeMarce, supra note 26, at 451 n.122 (citing one commentator's view that it is
"'inconsistent to reimburse a custodial parent in whole or in part for the expense of paid
child care while denying her any financial recognition for the value of the care she herself
provides"') (quoting Sally S. Goldfarb, Child Support Guidelines: A Model for Fair Allo-
cation of Child Care, Medical, and Educational Expenses, 21 FAM. L.Q. 325, 349 (1987)).
DeMarce also identifies a fundamental flaw in legal decisions that ascribe no monetary
value to caregiving, pointing out that costs for child care outside the home, incurred so
that a parent can work, are costs that are considered in making child support determina-
tions. See DeMarce, supra note 26, at 450 n.199. See also Estin, supra note 41, at 798
(commenting on the view that economic value should be attributed to services provided
within a family).
173. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.1(C)(7) (West 1991).
174. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(k) (West 1994). But see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
108.1(B)(13) (Michie Supp. 1999) (requiring the courts to consider "[c]ontributions, mone-
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ascribe to caregiving in many property distribution cases."' Thus, gen-
eral judicial reliance upon a theory that child care is not work, including
the characteristic labels of "voluntary underemployment" and "voluntary
unemployment," seems oddly limited to the context of child support de-
terminations.'76
III. SERVING THE BEST INTERESTS OF CHILDREN WHEN IMPUTING
PARENTAL INCOME: WEAKNESSES IN CURRENT APPROACHES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
A. Can a Child's Best Interests be Bought?
Children have certain needs that require money, such as food, shelter
and clothing.' 77 The best interests of a child, however, cannot be
bought.' 78 Embedding a child's intangible need for love and nurture in
oblique phrases such as "special circumstances' ' 179 trivializes the value of
caregiving, and demeans parents who would forego some material wealth
in favor of their children's emotional well-being.'O
Developmental psychologists have written extensively on the impor-
tance of a child forming close emotional bonds with a consistent care-
tary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family").
175. See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (discussing property distribution
cases in which value was ascribed to caregiving).
176. See supra Part II.B (discussing differing approaches to valuing caregiving in prop-
erty distribution and spousal maintenance cases in comparison with child support cases).
177. See supra note 8 (providing examples of financially oriented child support guide-
lines, illustrating congressional consensus on children's fundamental need for economic
support).
178. See Estin, supra note 41, at 785 (summarizing "fundamental parental responsibili-
ties" to demonstrate the irrelevance of money to certain basic needs of children). Profes-
sor Estin defines parental responsibilities as "preserving the child's life and health; foster-
ing the child's physical, emotional, and intellectual growth; and shaping the child's
behavior to produce an acceptable adult member of the social group." Id.
179. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(k) (West 1994).
180. See DeMarce, supra note 26, at 468 (offering a public policy argument against the
law's failure to consider the value of caregiving). DeMarce noted that "[a] judicial deter-
mination that a parent staying at home with minor children is 'voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed' carries with it a powerful value judgment about the relative worth of dif-
ferent roles in our society." Id. For an egregious example of judicial diminution of the
value of caregiving, see the trial court holding which led to Hartung v. Hartung, 306
N.W.2d 16, 21 (Wis. 1981), in which the Supreme Court of Wisconsin soundly overturned
a trial court decision to award only short-term maintenance to a custodial spouse. The
trial court judge stated, "I don't think she would want to sit around the rest of her life. My
God, she will turn into a vegetable if she did that anyhow." Id. at 19. In overturning the
trial court, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that "if the circumstances dictate to a
woman that the appropriate choice for her is to remain at home to care for small children,
that choice, like a career choice, will be respected by this court." Id. at 21.
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giver, typically a custodial parent."' It is also well recognized that main-
taining an emotional relationship with both the custodial and non-
custodial parent is generally best for a child.' The courts, however, are
inconsistent in their recognition of such sociological findings, and simi-
larly inconsistent in their recognition of good faith employment decisions
made by parents to benefit their children. Unquestionably, it is diffi-
cult to quantify the value of caregiving, or to determine whether a par-
ticular child would benefit more from increased parental presence or in-
creased financial support.'8 Declaring parents "voluntarily
unemployed," however, because they have chosen to forego certain ma-
terial wealth in order to provide care and guidance to their children, is a
harsh judicial assessment of a difficult parental decision, and one which
presumes that a child's economic interests will always outweigh the
child's emotional needs.185 In those jurisdictions that do not recognize
181. See Estin, supra note 41, at 792 (noting that "[tihe standard references in devel-
opmental psychology explore extensively the importance for infants and young children of
a sensitive, responsive caregiver with whom the child can develop a secure attachment,
and the risk of serious developmental consequences where those early bonds are not
achieved and protected"). Professor Estin cites a number of resources and detailed stud-
ies on the impact of emotional bonding on healthy child development. See id. at nn.274-
78, 794 nn.286 & 291-92. One early childhood educator's research and experience have
led her to conclude that meaningful, consistent relationships with adults, typically parents,
are a necessary prerequisite to a child's ability to develop appropriate social skills. Inter-
view with Jacky Howell, Early Childhood Educator and Consultant, Montgomery Child
Care Association, in Silver Spring, Md. (Oct. 29, 1998). Howell also observed that the se-
curity, safety, and trust that result from a consistent parent/child bond are critical factors
in establishing school readiness, commenting that "[iun order to be a learner, you must be
a risk taker; in order to be a risk taker, you must feel safe." Id. Therefore, this educator
asserts, when one parent leaves the family home, it becomes critical to maintain consis-
tency in the child's relationship and routine with the custodial parent. See id. According
to Howell, "[i]f we want children to be healthy, competent adults, we must tend to their
needs now." Id. But see Sharon Begley, The Parent Trap, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 7, 1998, at 52
(reviewing JUDITH RICH HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMPTION: WHY CHILDREN TURN
OUT THE WAY THEY Do; PARENTS MATTER LESS THAN YOU THINK AND PEERS
MATTER MORE (1998), which cites new studies purportedly demonstrating that peers are
more influential upon children than their parents).
182. See Canning v. Juskalian, 597 N.E.2d 1074, 1076-77 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (de-
creasing a support order issued to a non-custodial father in order to recognize the costs
associated with coast-to-coast travel necessary for the father to exercise his visitation
rights). The court in Canning noted "the importance which attaches to both parents
hav[ing] frequent and continuing association with their child, and the broad recognition of
the 'interests of the non-custodial parent and the child in visiting with each [other]."' Id.
(citations omitted).
183. See supra Parts II.A.1-3 (discussing differing approaches to considering parental
decisions to limit their earning capacity in order to spend time with their children).
184. See infra note 203 (discussing the necessity of recognizing the value of caregiving
in judicial decisionmaking).
185. See AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 85, commentary to § 3.06 at 70 (com-
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the nurturing parent doctrine, the courts' ready reliance on tangible fi-
nancial matters when deciding whether to impute income seems to be an
abdication of responsibility, a refusal to make the more difficult judg-
ments regarding intangible elements that affect a child's well-being.
1 6
Thus, in their search for consistency in child support orders, such courts
may have lost sight of the value of caregiving.'
7
B. Imputation of Income: A Self-Defeating Purpose?
Courts ascribe imputed income to voluntarily unemployed or under-
employed parents ostensibly to serve the children's best interests1 8 By
imputing income to parents who have, in good faith, reduced or elimi-
nated their income in order to be more available to their children, how-
ever, the courts may harm the very children whose interests they seek to
protect.'8 In treating caregiving as voluntary unemployment or under-
employment, and therefore imputing income to a parent, the courts may
impose an economic cost upon the child.'9
Imputing income to a parent increases that parent's financial obliga-
tion, but does not necessarily increase the actual financial resources
available to support the child because the parent may not realize the im-
menting that "[w]hen the law imputes gainful earnings to residential parents, it expresses a
judgment about how they should allocate their time between gainful employment and
child rearing, a matter normally left to the decisionmaking of parents"); see also Becker,
supra note 26, at 653 (suggesting that terms such as "voluntary unemployment" or "volun-
tary underemployment" tend to "mask the numerous policy issues involved").
186. See Estin, supra note 41, at 802 (noting, in the context of alimony and mainte-
nance law, that "the present ... laws ... have substantively ignored the issues of caregiv-
ing that are central to family life").
187. See id. at 774 (stating that "in legal analysis ... family care activities are irrele-
vant-noneconomic, nonpolitical, and legally unimportant"). Professor Estin offers the
following bleak commentary: "Apparently, family values are important only as far, and as
long, as each individual is interested in sharing a household. When that interest fades, all
that remains is a framework of legal rights, in which fairness is only a matter of autonomy
and self-interest." Id. at 768.
188. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (discussing imputation of income).
189. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text (discussing the harm that may re-
sult from the inappropriate imputation of income).
190. See DeMarce, supra note 26, at 452 (noting that if the income of one parent is ar-
tificially raised through imputation, the other parent's financial obligation may be de-
creased). DeMarce argues that
The casual observer might conclude that by imputing income to a caregiving par-
ent, the judge is recognizing the economic value of such work. However, the re-
verse is true: imputation of income treats caregiving as the equivalent of volun-
tary unemployment, and imposes a direct economic cost on the caregiver and
child by reducing the child support obligation of the noncustodial parent.
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puted income. 91 Furthermore, this focus on financial considerations fails
to give sufficient or consistent weight to non-economic factors that may
be relevant in meeting the breadth of a child's needs.' 92 The American
Law Institute summarizes this point by noting that "to the extent that in-
come is merely imputed, but not realized, the effect is to penalize the
child economically for the parent's decision to give the child more rather
than less direct parental care." 193
C. Recommendations: Serving Children's Best Interests
In determining child support, any judicial analysis of a child's best in-
terests is incomplete absent an evaluation of the relative merits of a par-
ent's financial and emotional contributions to the child's welfare. 94 The
following recommendations provide a framework in which the courts
may consistently give consideration to parents' non-financial contribu-
tions to a child's welfare, without surrendering their ultimate duty and
authority to determine what is in the child's best interests9
Each state should establish an exception to the labels of "voluntary
unemployment" and "voluntary underemployment," applicable to both
custodial and non-custodial parents of minor children.'96 The application
of such an exception would be based on the court's evaluation of whether
the parent's actions in reducing or eliminating income were reasonable,
justified, and in good faith, without the intent to avoid child support obli-
191. See Canning v. Juskalian, 597 N.E.2d 1074, 1077-78 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992)
(recognizing that "income generated by attribution is often fictional and, therefore, of no
benefit to the child entitled to support").
192. See supra note 181 (discussing the importance of consistent parent-child relation-
ships to healthy child development).
193. AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 85, commentary to § 3.06 at 70.
194. See Estin, supra note 41, at 722 (arguing for the "rehabilitation" of family care as
"an important value worthy of greater recognition in the economic management of di-
vorce"). In modern divorce law, according to Professor Estin, there is a "remarkable dis-
regard for caregiving-the norms of nurturance, altruism, and mutual responsibility that
are usually thought to characterize family life." Id. at 721; see also Karen Czapanskiy,
Giving Credit Where Credit is Due, in CRITICAL ISSUES, CRITICAL CHOICES: SPECIAL
TOPICs IN CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES DEVELOPMENT 141, 148-51 (Women's Legal
Defense Fund 1986) (arguing for child support guidelines that expressly take non-
economic contributions of the custodial parent into account).
195. See supra note 4 (discussing the court's duty to protect children of divorced par-
ents).
196. This recommendation would extend the nurturing parent doctrine to all states.
See supra Part I.D (discussing the nurturing parent doctrine in its present form). This rec-
ommendation would also give recognition to the value of continuing contact with the non-
custodial parent that certain courts have recognized. See supra note 91 (discussing cases
that demonstrate the value of a child's continuing involvement with the non-custodial par-
ent).
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gations. 97 The nurturing parent doctrine, in its current form, accom-
plishes this objective to a limited extent, extending deference to nurtur-
ing decisions made by the custodial parent of young children.198 The law,
however, holds both parents financially responsible for their children.' 99
Therefore, both parents should bear accountability for their children's
emotional welfare and be entitled to receive the benefits of their chil-
dren's companionship.00
Because the proposed exception is not absolute, the courts should ap-
ply a balancing test as a prerequisite to the imputation of income to ei-
ther a custodial or non-custodial parent. 20' This analysis would weigh the
197. See Saussy v. Saussy, 638 So. 2d 711,713 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (applying the factors
that this Comment recommends for application in all courts). In the case of a custodial
parent, the exception would apply to parental decisions to reduce or eliminate employ-
ment in order to be available to his or her children. See supra note 84 and accompanying
text (providing examples of cases in which the courts declined to impute income to custo-
dial parent who had voluntarily reduced income in order to provide personal care for his
or her children). In the case of a non-custodial parent, the exception would apply to pa-
rental decisions to reduce employment in order to maximize visitation. See supra note 91
and accompanying text (providing examples of cases in which the courts have declined to
impute income to non-custodial parents who voluntarily reduced income in order to
maximize visitation). For a discussion of other considerations favoring non-attribution of
income, see Canning v. Juskalian, 597 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 n.9 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). The
Canning court suggests that factors favoring non-attribution of income include:
(1) avoiding the creation of economic disincentives to remarriage and the rearing
of children; (2) not punishing innocent children for their parent's actions; (3)
giving priority to the "nurturing parent" doctrine; and (4) recognizing that the in-
come generated by attribution is often fictional and, therefore, of no benefit to
the child entitled to support.
Id. (citations omitted). According to Canning, factors favoring attribution of income in-
clude:
(1) ... minimizing the economic impact of family breakup on children by dis-
couraging parental unemployment and underemployment; (2) recognizing that
staying at home to care for subsequent children frequently constitutes volitional
unemployment; and (3) placing the burden of any hardship to children of a sec-
ond marriage upon those who voluntarily formed the second family.
Id. (citations omitted).
198. See supra Part I.D (discussing the nurturing parent doctrine).
199. See Canning, 597 N.E.2d at 1077 (reiterating that "[t]he concept of joint parental
responsibility for child support is well established" and that "'[t]here is no question that
[the child support statute]... imposes a duty of child support on the wife as well as on the
husband"' (quoting Silvia v. Silvia, 400 N.E.2d. 1330 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980))); see also su-
pra Part I.B.1 (discussing gender-neutrality of the child support guidelines).
200. See Commonwealth ex rel. Wasiolek v. Wasiolek, 380 A.2d 400, 403 (noting that
"[i]t is no longer the law that a mother is presumed more fit to care for a child than a fa-
ther"); see also Saussy, 638 So. 2d at 714 (opining that "[a] father's children benefit not
only by the money he is able to earn, but by the presence of his company").
201. See AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 85, commentary to § 3.06 at 70 (recom-
mending that imputation of income to both custodial and non-custodial parents should be
approached cautiously, but that imputation of income to a custodial parent should be "ap-
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relative benefits to a child of his parents working full time, working re-
duced hours, or staying home.m Under this proposal, the courts would
retain the discretion to impute income; the recommended analysis would
simply ensure that the courts do not rush to judgment on the parent's
earning capacity without considering first the children's non-economic
needs.0 3
In order for the judiciary to give value to caregiving while remaining
vigilant against parents who attempt to shirk their responsibilities to their
children, the courts should apply the balancing test by giving reasonable
deference to good faith parental decisions regarding their children's best
interests. °4 Reasonable people may debate the relative merits of staying
home, working part-time, or working full time.'O Ultimately, however,
the decision is a personal one-a matter of choice-made by the person
who presumably knows the child best.04 Given the fundamental right of
proached with even more circumspection").
202. See IND. CODE ANN. 2 Court Rules, Support Guideline 3, commentary 2(c)(1)
(Michie 1999) ("The need for a custodial parent to contribute to the financial support of a
child must be carefully balanced against the need for the parent's full time presence in the
home."); see also Saussy v. Saussy, 638 So. 2d 711, 714 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a
parent who quit his job in order to have more visitation time with his children was not vol-
untarily unemployed). The Saussy court stated "nowhere does the law require that a par-
ent work 60-70 hours to the detriment of the children's right to the parent's company."
Id.; see also Estin, supra note 41 at 794 n.286 (commenting on the negative effect on chil-
dren of parental focus on material well-being).
203. See Estin, supra note 41, at 803 ("Caregiving, particularly in its modern expres-
sions, is not easily addressed within our legal traditions. Our most difficult task may also
be the simplest: to affirm that family life is still a matter of deep personal importance and
valid legal concern.").
204. See DeMarce, supra note 26, at 429-30 (arguing that "[a]s a matter of public pol-
icy, the law should remain neutral, [and] respect the private choices made by parents con-
cerning their allocation of labor between the household and the marketplace"); see also
Becker, supra note 26, at 705-06 (arguing that a caregiving parent's decision to defer em-
ployment in order to care for a young child should be given substantial weight).
205. See Thomas v. Thomas, 589 A.2d 1372, 1373 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (de-
ferring to a mother's decision to remain home with her young children from a subsequent
marriage). The court in Thomas recognized that one can argue the costs and benefits of
staying home rather than working. See id. Accordingly, the court decided it should not
overrule a parent's decision or punish the decision by imposing a "monetary award" be-
cause such parental decisions go "to the very heart of the manner in which children are
raised." Id. Therefore, interference with such parental decisions constitutes an "imper-
missible intrusion into an area typically considered beyond the State's reach." Id; see also
supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the decision of the court in Common-
wealth ex rel. Wasiolek v. Wasiolek, 380 A.2d 400 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977), which gave signifi-
cant weight to the custodial parent's opinion regarding how to best serve the child's
needs).
206. See AMERICAN LAW INST. supra note 85, commentary to § 3.06 at 69 (noting that
"[t]he ALI guideline does not second guess the hard choices facing parents with residen-
tial responsibility for preschool children"). The Guideline should also be applied "with
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a parent to raise his or her children,2°7 and absent a finding of bad faith, it
is unduly intrusive for the court to substitute its judgment for a parent's
in deciding whether money or parental presence will best serve a child.2°8
Instead, comporting with the basic principle of non-interference with
family relations,2°9 it is appropriate that the courts give parents' decisions
in these matters reasonable, although not absolute, deference. °
The court has continuing jurisdiction over child support decisions"'
and can assess the credibility of parental claims as to motive for reducingor eimintingwag-earing ...212
or eliminating wage-earning potential. Therefore, the court may adjust
a child support obligation if a parent fails to demonstrate that his or her
motives in reducing or eliminating income were sincere."' The recom-
mended balancing test would undoubtedly place an additional burden
due respect for the residential parent's reasonable parenting choices." Id. at 70.
207. See Thomas, 589 A.2d at 1373 (characterizing the right to conceive and raise chil-
dren as "essential" and a "basic civil [right] of man").
208. See Wasiolek, 380 A.2d at 403 (holding that "[o]nce custody of a very young child
is awarded, the custodial parent, father or mother, must decide whether the child's welfare
is better served by the parent's presence in the home or by the parent's full-time employ-
ment").
209. See supra note 1 (discussing the natural right of a parent to care for his or her
children).
210. See Becker, supra note 26, at 701-08 (posing four approaches to deference toward
parental employment reduction decisions made in order to care for children). Professor
Becker suggests that the four possible approaches are absolute deference, modified abso-
lute deference, child care as a substantial but not determining factor, and no deference to
parental preference. See id. Professor Becker also recommends that courts give deference
to parental decisions, while considering the following factors: the child's age (giving sub-
stantial weight to a caregiving parent's decision to defer employment in order to care for a
very young child); hardship the non-custodial parent may encounter; any adverse effects
upon the child if the non-custodial parent cannot provide sufficient support and the em-
ployment waived by the custodial parent would result in the inadequate level of support;
and whether the non-custodial parent has previously agreed with the custodial parent's
decision to forego employment in order to care for their children. See id. at 706-07.
211. See supra notes 5-7 (discussing the courts' right and duty to protect the child until
the age of majority).
212. The courts have often analyzed a parent's historical behavior to determine
whether his or her actions were in good faith, examining facts such as the frequency and
nature of the parent's contact with the children, the level of involvement previously dem-
onstrated by the parent and, in the case of a non-custodial parent, the extent and consis-
tency of prior visitation and the regularity of child support payments. See Gould v. Gould,
687 So. 2d 685, 693 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to impute income to a father who had
reduced his work week in order to exercise his visitation rights because he had been dili-
gent and regular in his visits).
213. See John 0. v. Jane 0., 601 A.2d 149, 156-57 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (provid-
ing a list of factors a court should consider when imputing income, including consideration
for whether or not the parent has ever withheld support); see also McHale v. McHale, 612
So. 2d 969, 972 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (imputing income to a father who had been inconsis-
tent in exercising his visitation rights and was in arrears in his child support payments).
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upon the courts; however, the courts' mandate to protect children of di-
vorced parents demands no less.1
IV. CONCLUSION
The child support guidelines presently in place in all fifty states share a
common and admirable goal-to protect the best interests of children of
divorced parents. Unfortunately, state courts have been unsuccessful in
articulating or applying a consistent approach to achieving this "best in-
terests of the child" objective. Instead, many state courts have utilized a
limited approach that focuses on the economic aspects of children's wel-
fare, with insufficient attention to caregiving as a necessary component of
children's well-being. Therefore, we must seek judicial recognition of a
simple and compelling truth-that parental duty extends beyond the
pocketbook. Only through consistent consideration of children's emo-
tional, as well as financial, requirements can the breadth of children's
needs be addressed and the term "best interests of the child" have
meaning.
214. See supra note 203 (noting both the difficulty and necessity of recognizing the
value of caregiving in legal proceedings); see also Becker, supra note 26, at 700 (arguing
that the right to forgo employment is not simply based on a "freedom of choice rationale,"
but is required for fulfillment of a "social mandate" to provide care for children).
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